# Monarch: A Fuzzing Framework for Distributed File Systems

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#### **DFSes are critical infrastructure**





### **But DFSes are not reliable**

Issue					
- > Opti	11K Ceph bug reports				
Apply	Clear           # V Drojart Tracker Status Drinthy         Subject Assigna	Undated			
66	Lustre v I	dvanced			
66	17K Lustre hug reports				
□ 66	Order by				
66	<ul> <li>LU-17917 sanity-hsm: 26A ((: != 5 : syntax error: operand expected (error token is *!= 5 ")</li> </ul>				
66	LU-17916 Enable folio allocation support on the buffed io read/write path (BIO)				
66	gds io crashes in unaligned_dio				
66	LU-17914 Inetctl net set command issues false error				
	LU-17913     sanity-inet test_220 is silently failing				
	LU-17911     Faked flexible array usage causes crash when Fortify feature is enabled				

#### Memory-unsafe languages

#### **State-sharing across clients**

**High concurrency** 

#### **Fault tolerance**

#### Finding and fixing bugs in DFSes become important

# **Existing approaches to finding DFSes bugs**

Regression Testing	Model Checking	Formal Verification
Test suit	Modist SAMC	Verdi Ironfleet
Manual expert effort Limited test cases	State explosion	Manual expert effort Mostly verify critical parts

#### Any automatic and scalable bug-finding techniques?

# **Fuzzing:** A practical and impactful approach

- Linux kernel fuzzer, **syzkaller**, detects over **1K bugs every year**<sup>1</sup>
- Specifically, more than **800 bugs in local file systems** over the years



Linux kernel bugs found by Syzkaller per year

### How does fuzzing work?



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#### **Current LFS fuzzers are not applicable for DFSes**

# **Missing pieces for fuzzing DFSes**



Single-node and in-kernel file system



Multi-node cross-kernel/userspace fuzzing architecture

**Distributed faults as a testing input space** 



Representation of single-kernel exe state

Representation of cross-node and cross-kernel/userspace execution states



Crash consistency + memory checker

A systematic DFS semantic checker

#### MONARCH A distributed file system fuzzer

#### **Monarch architecture**



#### **Monarch architecture**



#### **Two-step test case mutator**

Non-fault mode: Testing with file system syscalls only (e.g., open, read)

• Syscall templates and mutation rules

#### Fault mode: Testing with syscalls + injected faults

- **Distributed faults**  $\rightarrow$  Network partitions, node crashes
- How to deterministically inject faults? → Synchronization primitives
- At which granularity to inject faults? → Syscall granularity
- When to inject faults?  $\rightarrow$  After a test case triggers new execution state

### **Monarch architecture**



### What are the semantic bugs in DFS?

- **Semantic**: DFS state transitions specified in the spec
  - Syscalls: sequential and concurrent
  - Syscalls + faults



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# Which semantic bug types are missing?

- Semantic: DFS state transitions specified in the spec
  - Syscalls: sequential and concurrent
  - Syscalls + faults
- Semantic bugs: implementations violate the specified semantic



#### **DFS semantic checker: SYMSC**



#### **Emulate sequential syscall executions**

• Emulate syscalls one by one according to the specification



#### But the spec does not specify semantics under concurrency and faults

### How to emulate semantic under concurrency?

• Concurrency relation built from syscall's start and end timestamp



Concurrent execution

# Syscalls to atomic operations

• Syscalls are splitted into one or more atomic operations



Concurrent execution

### **Serialize concurrent atomic operations**

- Syscalls are splitted into one or more atomic operations
- Oracle states: emulate all interleavings among concurrent atomic operations



# Case study of a CephFS bug

Runtime state			Emulated states
Client 1	Client 2   open("A", O_CREAT , Y)		
open("A", O_CREAT , X)			inode.mode = X or Y
chmod("A", Y)			inode.mode = Y
stat("A", stat1) ; stat1.mode=Y	stat("A", stat ; stat2.mode	2) = <b>X</b>	<pre>stat1.mode = Y stat2.mode = Y</pre>
♥	,	▼	

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$\checkmark$	↓ ►	

#### What is the semantic under faults?

What's the semantic of a write under faults?



**Distributed file system nodes** 

### What is the semantic under faults?

- Apply the original semantic if the DFS is available to this syscall
- Return errors otherwise



**Distributed file system nodes** 

### **Implementation and evaluation setup**

- Two 64-core machines
- Ran intermittently for two months on six targeted DFSes



# How effective is Monarch in finding bugs?

• Monarch found bugs in all DFSes and categories, with a total of 48 bugs

	DFS	Memory bugs	Semantic bugs
·ŀ <mark>u·s·t·r</mark> ·e	Lustre	8	0
GlusterFS	GlusterFS	17	5
ORANGEFS	OrangeFS	3	0
<b>ee</b> GFS'	BeeGFS	0	2
<b>o</b> ceph	CephFS	4	1
NFS	NFS	8	0
	Total	40	8

### What are the characteristics of DFS bugs?

#### Faults play a critical role in exposing these bugs

 $\rightarrow$  14/40 memory bugs and 3/8 semantic bugs are exposed under faults

Vulnerable code is scattered in both servers and clients

- $\rightarrow$  17 bugs (servers) vs 31 bugs (clients)
- $\rightarrow$  The root causes of semantics bugs are mostly in DFS servers

Bug exposure might depend on specific DFS configurations

### Conclusion



- **Problem:** Automatic and scalable bug-finding tool for DFSes
- **Our solution Monarch**: The first DFS fuzzing framework
  - Multi-node and cross-context fuzzing architecture
  - A two-step mutator to test DFSes with syscalls and faults
  - DFS semantic checker
- **Takeway**: Fuzzing is effective on distributed systems as well
- Artifact: <a href="https://github.com/rs3lab/Monarch">https://github.com/rs3lab/Monarch</a>